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[Sac. No. 6268. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1953.] 
WILLIAM H. PIRKLE et al., Respondents, v. OAKDALE 
UNION GRAMMAR SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Ap-
pellants. 
(1] Schools-Tort Liability-Officers and Employees.-The stand-
ard of care required of an officer or employee of a public 
school is that which a person of ordinary prudence, charged 
with his duties, would exercise under the same circumstances. 
[2] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school dis-
trict, its principal and physical education instructor for in-
juries sustained by student during noon recess while playing 
touch football on team representing eighth grade against 
team representing seventh grade, the fact that the method of 
selecting players for free play games according to grades is 
utilized throughout the state is competent evidence of the 
reasonableness of its use by defendants. 
(3] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school dis-
trict, its principal and physical education instructor for in-
juries sustained by student during noon recess while playing 
touch football on team representing eighth grade against 
team representing seventh grade, evidence that touch football 
is not a dangerous or rough game and testimony of witnesses 
that, although practice of matching seventh against eighth 
grade had been followed extensively throughout county, they 
knew of no serious injury prior to the one sustained by plain-
tiff, compel conclusion that the method of segregation em-
ployed by defendants was a reasonable one. 
[4] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school dis-
trict, its principal and physical education instructor for in-
juries sustained !luring noon recess by a 97-pound student, 
5 feet, 4 inches tall while blocking a 145-pound student, 5 
feet, 10 inches tall during a game of touch football, evidence 
that "exponent charts," used in connection with interscholastic 
contests and in required physical education periods to classify 
pupils according to certain combinations of age, height and 
weight, were designed primarily to present equal opportunities 
of competition and only partially for safety of participants, 
and that the classifications are broad enough to permit a varia-
tion in weights at least as great as that involved in the 
[1] See 10 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1947 Rev.), Schools, § 79.1 et 
seq.; Am.Jur., Schools, § 56 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Schools, § 67; [2-6] Schools, § 74; 
[7] Appeal and Error, § 1419. 
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present case, fails to establish such charts as a standard of 
care, the failure to observe which may be deemed negligence. 
[5] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school dis-
trict, its principal and physical education instructor for in-
juries sustained by student during noon recess while playing 
touch football on team representing eighth grade against team 
representing seventh grade, there is no legal basis for a finding 
of negligence where such activity was not an inherently 
dangerous one, the boys were selected according to their skill 
and by a reasonable means of classification, they were properly 
instructed, experienced and proficient, and they participated 
in the game only if they chose to do so. 
[6] !d.-Tort Liability-Evidence.-In action against school dis-
trict, its principal and physical education instructor for in-
juries sustained by student during noon recess while playing 
touch football, defendants' liability may not be predicated on 
a failure to provide prompt medical attention where plaintiffs' 
medical expert, the sole witness to testify on this point, stated 
that a layman could not reasonably have been expected to 
discover the nature of the injury sooner and, in any event, 
no injury resulted to the boy from the delay. 
[7] Appeal-Directing Judgment for Opposite Party-Judgment 
Notwithstanding Verdict.-Where it appears on appeal that 
defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding a verdict 
for plaintiffs should have been granted, the appellate court 
may order judgment to be so entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanis-
laus County and from an order denying motions for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. H. L. Chamberlain, Judge. 
Reversed with directions. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by 
student at school d'uring noon recess while playing touch foot-
ball. Judgment for plaintiffs reversed with directions. 
Vernon F. Gant, Frederick W. Reyland, ,Jr., County Coun-
sel, and "\Villiam R. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel, for 
Appellants. 
C. Ray Robinson, Margaret A. Flynn, .James A. Cobey and 
William B. Boone, for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-William H. Pirkle, an eighth grade student 
at the Oakdale Union Grammar School, sustained injuries 
while playing in a game of touch football. The chief ground 
relied upon by the school district, B. W. Gripenstraw, its 
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principal, and Jules Perrin, the instructor in physical educa-
tion, for a reversal of the judgment against them and orders 
denying certain motions is that there is no evidence upon 
which liability for damages legally may be based. 
The jury, considering the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiffs, and giving them the benefit of all in-
ferences reasonably to be drawn from it, might have found 
the following facts : During noon recess periods, the boys in 
the seventh and eighth grades were permitted to engage in 
"free play" activities. The games at such times included 
touch football, in which a ''tackle'' is accomplished by touch-
ing the ball carrier with both hands. Bodily contact is limited 
to a shoulder or body block, with both the blocker's feet on 
the ground. When properly regulated, the game is not rough. 
Free play games were not a part of the required physical 
education program, and the boys participated in them only 
if they elected to do so. A team representing the seventh 
grade competed against another from the eighth grade. One 
boy from each grade was captain and chose the players for 
his team. As was , customary in free play games, the par-
ticipants were not selected according to age, size, or weight. 
As a consequence the players ranged in weight from 85 to 
190 pounds. 
At the time of the accident, William was a member of the 
eighth grade team. He was 13 years, 4 months of age, 5 
feet, 4 inches tall, and weighed approximately 97 pounds. 
During the game he blocked Jack Perkins, a seventh grade 
student weighing 145 pounds, who was 5 feet, 10 inches 
tall, and 14% years old·. William was struck in the abdomen 
by Jack's knee. He remained in the game for the next two 
or three plays and then went to the sideline, where he lay 
down on a bench. 
He was soon sent to a first aid room where Gripenstraw had 
him lie down and covered him with a blanket. Near the 
close of the school day, Perrin came to see him. When Wil-
liam passed urine at Perrin's suggestion, it was observed that 
the urine contained blood. Perrin then took William home. 
This was about two hours after the accident. William's 
spleen and left kidney were removed about five hours later. 
John Pirkle, the boy's father, sued for damages in the 
amount of his expenditures for William's medical care and, 
as guardian ad litem for William, for damages for the in-
juries the boy sustained. The theory of the complaint was 
that the defendants negligently failed properly to supervise 
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the game, and that Gripenstraw and Perrin carelessly ne-
glected to give William prompt medical attention. Named 
as defendants were Perrin, Gripenstraw, the school district, 
and the members of its board of trustees. The demurrer 
of the trustees was sustained and the action dismissed as to 
them. 
During the trial, the motions of the defendants for a non-
suit and for a directed verdict were denied. The jury re-
turned a verdict for William of $7,500 and awarded the 
father $800. Motions by the defendants for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict and for a new trial were denied. 
The appeal is from the judgment entered upon the verdict 
and from an order denying the motions for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict. 
The principal ground relied upon in challenging the judg-
ment is that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the ver-
dict. It is argued that there is no evidence justifying the 
jury's implied finding that the defendants were negligent in 
supervising the game, or that William sustained injury be-
cause of a negligent failure to provide prompt medical at-
tention. 
[1] The standard of care required of an officer or em-
ployee of a public school is that which a person of ordinary 
prudence, charged with his duties, would exercise under the 
same circumstances. (Bellman v. San Francisco H. S. Dist., 
11 Cal.2d 576, 582 [81 P.2d 894]; Hough v. Orleans E. S. 
Dist., 62 Cal.App.2d 146, 155 [144 P.2d 383]; Buzzard v. 
East Lake School Dist., 34 Cal.App.2d 316, 321 [93 P.2d 233] ; 
Ellis v. Burns Valley School Dist., 128 Cal.App. 550, 553 [18 
P.2d 79] .) The plaintiffs take the position that the jury 
reasonably might have found that the defendants failed to 
maintain proper supervisorial control of the manner in which 
the game was played. 
In their physical education classes, the boys received in-
struction in the rules of touch football, including demonstra-
tions of the correct methods of blocking and tackling. They 
were skilled in the game, having played it many times previ-
ously. Immediately prior to the contest, they again were 
instructed that blocking was to be done with both feet on 
the ground, and were warned that rough play would not be 
tolerated. Perrin, the physical education instructor, acted 
as referee and Hass, his assistant, as head linesman. The in-
jury occurred in the course of a play executed in accordance 
with the rules of the game; no charge is made that any of 
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the players conducted himself improperly. In short, there 
i1; no evidence sufficient to predicate negligence upon a failure 
to supervise the playing of the game. 
'l'he Pirkles assert that the defendants were negligent in 
the manner in which the players were segregated. They 
contend that the jury reasonably might have found that the 
defendants should not have allowed boys of such different 
weights to play in the game in which William was injured. 
Specifically, they argue, the players should have been seg-
regated according to an "exponent chart" which was used 
in connection with the required physical education programs 
and interschool games. 
Physical education programs in the elementary schools are 
an accepted part of the curriculum. (Ed. Code, § 8252; 
Underhill v. Alameda E. S. Dist., 133 Cal.App. 733, 735 [24 
P.2d 849] .) A recognized and desirable part of such pro-
grams consists of organized free play games of the type here 
concer1wd. (Kerby v. Elk Grove Union H. S. Dist., 1 Cal.App. 
2d 246, 248 [36 P.2d 431].) However, the difficulty in ad-
ministering such activity is well illustrated by the evidence 
in the present case. To fill the teams, 22 boys must be se-
lected from those desiring to play. Such selection must be 
made in a manner permitting the smaller boys to compete 
with safety and some degree of success, and yet without 
denying to the larger boys opportunity to participate. If 
the classification is made too narrow and rigid, particularly 
in the smaller schools, a sufficient number of players will not 
be available to make up the teams. 
[2] The record shows that the selection of players for 
free play games according to grades is a convenient and prac-
tical method of segregation. That such method is utilized 
throughout the state is competent evidence of the reason-
ableness of its use by the defendants in the present case. 
(Perurnean v. Wills, 8 Cal.2d 578, 583 [67 P.2d 96] .) [3] All 
the evidence is to the effect that touch football is not a dan-
gerous or rough game. Several witnesses testified that, al-
though the practice of matching the seventh against the 
eighth grade had been followed extensively throughout the 
county, they knew of no serious injury prior to the one to 
Pirkle. From this evidence, it must be concluded that the 
method of segregation employed by the defendants was a 
reasonable one. 
[4] This determination is not affected by the fact that 
so-called ''exponent charts'' were used in connection with 
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interscholastic contests and in the required physical educa-
tion periods. Such charts classify the pupils according to 
certain combinations of age, height, and weight. According 
to the evidence, apart from the fact that they are useful only 
where there is a large group of boys to draw from, the charts 
are designed primarily to present equal opportunities of com-
petition, and, if at all, only partially for the safety of the 
participants. However, the uncontradicted testimony of school 
officials using the chart is to the effect that the classifica-
tions are broad enough to permit a variation in weights at 
least as great as that involved in the present case. In addi-
tion, players in the lower classifications are permitted to com-
pete in the higher ones if they possess sufficient skill. In 
short, the evidence fails to establish such charts as a stand-
ard of care, the failure to observe which may be deemed negli-
gence. 
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the holding in 
Bellman v. San Francisco H. S. Dist., 11 Cal.2d 576 [81 P.2d 
894]. In the Bellman case, a high school girl was injured 
during a required physical education period while attempt-
ing to perform a tumbling exercise. There was evidence 
from which the jury reasonably might have found that the 
exercise was inherently dangerous and that its performance 
required, in addition to physical strength and agility, a proper 
mental attitude. At the time she attempted the exercise, 
the girl was suffering from a knee injury, and she was taking 
part in the class against her wishes. The record also showed 
that the physical instructor in charge knew that she had 
failed in prior attempts to perform the trick. It was held 
that liability might be imposed only where the evidence 
showed a failure on the part of the school officials to use 
ordinary care. "What is ordinary care depends upon the 
circumstances of each particular case and is to be determined 
as a fact with reference to the situation and knowledge of 
the parties." (P. 582.) A majority of the court joined in 
the conclusion that those facts justified the submission of the 
issue of negligence to the jury. Three justices dissented upon 
the ground that, even under the unusual circumstances pre-
sented in that case, the evidence would not reasonably sup-
port a finding of negligence. 
The facts of the present case, however, are readily dis-
tinguishable. [5] The activity here involved was not an 
inherently dangerous one. The boys were selected according 
to their skill and by a reasonable means of classification. They 
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were properly instructed, experienced, and proficient, and 
they participated in the game only if they chose to do so. 
Under such circumstances, there is no legal basis for a find-
ing of negligence. 
(6] Nor is there merit in the contention that liability may 
be predicated upon a failure to provide prompt medical at-
tention. Plain tiffs' medical expert, the sole witness to testify 
on this point, stated that a layman could not reasonably 
have been expected to discover the nature of the injury sooner 
and, in any event, no injury resulted to the boy from the 
delay. 
[7] The evidence being insufficient to sustain the verdict 
and judgment, the defendants' motions for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict should have been granted. Under 
such circumstances, this court may order judgment to be 
so entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629 ; Jordan v. Guerra, 23 
Cal.2d 469, 472 [144 P.2d 349]; Johnson v. Sacramento North-
ern Ry., 54 Cal.App.2d 528, 543 [129 P.2d 503].) 
The judgment and the order denying the motions for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict are reversed and the 
trial court is directed to enter its order granting said motions. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, .T.-I dissent. 
The majority of this court has again invaded the realm 
of fact finding, and in violation of the settled rule that 
facts must be determined in the trial court, has found and 
determined the issues of fact contrary to the trier of fact-
the jury in this case-and the trial judge who denied motions 
for a nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict and a new trial. In so holding, this court again denies 
litigants the right to a jury trial on issues of fact in a case 
where a trial by jury is admittedly a matter of right under 
the Constitution and laws of this state. 
What was the ultimate issue of fact to be determined in 
this case? It was whether or not the conduct of the indi-
vidual defendants was that of a reasonably prudent person 
under like circumstances. If the conduct was not such, he was 
negligent, and if such negligent conduct was a proximate 
cause of the injuries suffered by plaintiff, liability was estab-
lished. 
It must be remembered that a jury and trial judge heard 
the evidence in this case and concluded that the conduct of 
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either Gripenstraw or Perrin or both of them was not that of 
a reasonably prudent person and that either or both of them 
was or were negligent. It cannot be denied that this ultimate 
fact was so determined. 
The members of the jury and trial judge are presumed to 
have ''reasonable minds.'' They saw the participants and saw 
and heard the witnesses and must have concluded that a 
reasonably prudent person would not have permitted boys 
ranging in weight from 85 to 190 pounds to engage in a 
game of touch football under the circumstances there de-
picted. These fact finders, with ''reasonable minds,'' may 
have felt that a reasonably prudent person in charge of the 
playground would have applied the "exponent chart" which 
was admitted to be "partially for the safety of the partici-
pants" in such a game. These fact finders, with "reasonable 
minds,'' may have disbelieved the witnesses who testified that 
touch football, when played as described by them, would not 
endanger the life or limb of the participants. In short, these 
fact finders with "reasonable minds," on whom the Constitu-
tion and law of this state places the responsibility of determin-
ing issues of fact, concluded from the evidence that a reason-
ably prudent person would not have permitted little Willie 
Pirkle, 13 years, 4 months of age, 5 feet, 4 inches tall and 
weighing 97 pounds to play in a game of touch football with 
big, overgrown Jackie Perkins, 14 years, 6 months of age, 5 
feet, 10 inches tall and weighing 145 pounds, and th11t in so 
doing Mr. Gripenstraw or Mr. Perrin or both were guilty 
of negligence. 
Now, a majority of this court says that this jury and this 
trial judge did not possess "reasonable minds"; that they 
are not entitled to the benefit of the presumption which the 
law has bestowed upon them-that they possess ''reasonable 
minds"; and that the constitutional mandate and statutory 
provisions relating to the function of a jury and a trial judge 
are of no force or effect whatsoever as this court arrogates to 
itself both the fact finding and law making powers. 
No evidence of negligence, the majority says. But what 
is the test for determining when negligence is a question of 
fact or a question of law? The only test mentioned in the 
lawbooks is the so called "reasonable minds" test. That is, 
where the evidence is such that ''reasonable minds'' cannot 
differ as to the conclusion to be reached, it is a question of 
law. The majority does not mention this test or any other 
test. It simply declares arbitrarily, contrary to the conclusion 
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reached by the jury and trial judge, that there was "no negli-
gence." But suppose little ·willie Pirkle was only 8 years of 
age, 4 feet tall and weighed only 60 pounds and big, over-
grown Jackie Perkins was 16 years of age, 6 feet tall and 
weighed 200 pounds, and the record was the same in other 
respects, 'what would the majority say~ If it would find there 
was negligence in such a case, where should the line be drawn 7 
It seems only reasonable to me that if this court intends to 
overthrow the ''reasonable minds'' test as it has done in this 
case, it should lay down some other test or standard for de-
termining when the issue of negligence is one of fact or law. 
The present decision places the determination of this issue 
within the arbitrary power of four members of this court 
without regard to any test, standard or rule to guide either 
this court or any lower court in future cases. Thus, the reason 
of the law is superseded by the arbitrary rule of four men. 
Obviously this rule will change from time to time as the 
philosophy of the majority changes. 
The decision which the majority of this court has rendered 
in this case resolving an issue of fact contrary to the con-
clusion reached by the jury and the trial judge is more far-
reaching than its effect upon the law applicable to this par-
ticular case. In effect, it is an attack upon the jury system. 
By this decision the majority of this court says to the people 
of California, You can write into your Constitution and 
statutes that litigants in cases of this character are entitled 
to a trial by jury, but regardless of the determination by the 
jury of the factual issues, a majority of this court will have 
the last say as to the determination of the factual issues. This 
means that when a majority of this court desires to overthrow 
the factual determination by a jury it may do so regardless of 
the nature and character of the evidence supporting such 
determination. 
The volumes of the reported decisions of this court contain 
the record of the Justices of this court who have expressed 
their views on the effect of factual determinations by juries 
and it may be gleaned therefrom that some of those Justices 
have not been in accord with the constitutional and statutory 
provisions which make the jury system a part of our system 
of jurisprudence. While the validity of these provisions 
has been settled beyond the realm of successful attack, the 
operation of the system is greatly restricted and rendered 
ineffective by decisions such as this, which are becoming more 
numerous as the decisions of the present court are rendered. 
216 PIRKLE v. OAKDALE UNION ETc. ScHooL DisT. [40 C.2d 
By such decisions a bare majority of this court may snatch 
from a litigant his property and rights gained through the 
lawful process of a jury trial, thereby depriving such litigant 
of one of his most valuable, fundamental, constitutional rights, 
guaranteed by both the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution of California. Such is the situation in the 
case at bar. As one who believes in preserving the American 
way of life and upholding and supporting the Constitutions 
which guarantee the continuance of that way of life, I cannot 
refrain from expressing my unqualified disapproval of this 
decision and those of similar import which is now the trend 
of decision by the majority of this court. 
Because I believe in upholding the constitutional guarantee 
of the right of trial by jury and the statutory law of this 
state which confers upon a jury anq trial judge the exclusive 
power of determining the facts in a case such as this, and 
because it appears beyond question that an honest evaluation 
of the record in this case must necessarily resolve the issue 
of negligence here to be one of fact which must be determined 
by the jury and trial judge in accordance with the process of 
law as defined in our Constitution and statutes, I would affirm 
the judgment in this case. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied March 
9, 1953. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
